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New financial institutions, pension funds, are being
established in Central and Eastern Europe, that are also an
important element of the social security system. They pro-
vide an additional source of income in old age. This source
is all the more important insofar as public, pay-as-you-go
pension systems in many countries are having problems with
meeting previous pension commitments, which were often
excessively generous and did not take into account potential
changes in demographic conditions and the labour market.
Pension funds are primarily business entities whose
financial success brings benefits to their participants  future
old-age pensioners. At the same time, though, these are
social institutions, as they contribute to securing income in a
socially difficult situation  for old age. Their goals thus
include both high effectiveness, leading to the increase of
invested premiums so that these provide income whose
growth rate would not be lower than the rate of wage
growth, coupled with a high level of operational safety to
make sure that future benefits can be paid at a level ensur-
ing, at least, that the real value of invested premiums is
maintained.
Pension funds work simultaneously towards the two
goals  economic and social  and these goals are inter-
linked. Success in achieving the economic goal increases
pensioners future incomes, and the security of attaining an
appropriate level is achieved automatically. On the other
hand, relentless striving for a high rate of return carries a
risk factor. The highest indices are achieved on the most
risky investments. However, regulation of the funds opera-
tions in the name of their safety limits the chances for attain-
ing higher returns  not only because investment freedom is
limited, but also because safety instruments are costly and
reduce the amount of resources possible to invest. Recon-
ciliation of the two goals of pension funds, the economic and
the social, is therefore a difficult problem requiring great
competence.
Societies in Central and Eastern Europe are very sensi-
tive to the issue of the operational safety of new financial
institutions, and especially pension funds. One can still
observe mistrust of capitalist institutions, while initial expe-
rience with private entities such as banks, savings societies
and insurance companies has not always been positive. In
this situation, ensuring safety by introducing a whole arsenal
of security and guarantee regulations together with the reg-
ulations on establishing funds becomes a political goal that
conditions the very passing of laws on private pension funds.
The subject of our consideration will be the experiences
relating to pension fund regulations from the point of view
of their safety of operations in five countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. These countries represent two groups.
The first includes Hungary and Poland, where the deci-
sion to establish pension funds was made earlier on. Thus,
they can now share their own, though modest, experience,
especially Hungary. Moreover, the debate in both countries
was very extensive and heated [Ferge, 1998; Golinows-
ka/Hausner, 1998]. The second group includes Bulgaria,
Estonia and Lithuania, the countries that passed laws on
pension funds in 1999. In this period, it was the issue of
introducing regulations on the safety of operations and on
guaranteeing a specified level of benefits from pension funds
that was extremely relevant.
In analysing the socially safe functioning of pension funds,
special attention has been devoted to institutions supervis-
ing the pension funds.
The present work was developed in the following order.
The first step involved the identification of risks and their
ranking according to the degree of danger (cf. Part 1). In the
second chapter we discuss the instruments for safeguarding
against and reducing the appearance of risk. For these
instruments, it was important to define them, as well as to
analyse the legal regulations, administrative standards, finan-
cial management standards, codes of ethics, the formula and
competence of supervisory institutions, and the working of
the market. Before presenting the principles and means of
balanced supervision over pension funds, in Part 3 we have
pointed out the basic dilemmas of achieving a balance
between economic and social goals. Next, we have
attempted to show the proper balance between regulatory
instruments and self-regulation in order to achieve a funds
balanced operations in terms of both effectiveness and safe-
ty (cf. Part 4).
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The fifth part of the report shows the practical experi-
ence of other countries, including those with much more
experience in this area than can be found in Central and
Eastern Europe. Taking into account the history of pension
funds development in these countries, we observe two
roads of development of safety institutions.
One way is to establish these institutions ex post. First,
funds were established, without any special supervisory reg-
ulations, and operated for many years without any distur-
bances, or with only minor ones, until a large-scale scandal
emerged. As a consequence, regulations were created to
prevent excessive risks. In the United States in the 1970s,
there was the ERISA package of regulations, and in the Unit-
ed Kingdom a dozen or so years later, after the scandal with
Robert Maxwells pension funds, the Goods Commission
was established which went on to prepare a proposal for
supervision.
The second way involves establishing supervision ex
ante, at the same time as the regulations on pension funds.
This solution is characteristic of the Latin American coun-
tries, which undertook pension reforms in the 1980s and
1990s, introducing a capital pillar. The countries of Central
and Eastern Europe are also undertaking safeguard regula-
tions ex ante.
The ex ante road is more difficult insofar as one has to
be able to identify any potential threats to the funds safe
operation and have a good knowledge of the various instru-
ments (preventing dangers) and their functioning in a bal-
anced way from the point of view of reconciling effective-
ness with social goals.
The last chapter presents the modest experiences of
five Central and Eastern European states. The report ends
with conclusions and recommendations, while the extracts
of law on supervision over pension funds are cited in the
appendix.
The project was conducted in co-operation with three
research teams from partner institutions:
1. Audrone Morkuniene, Elena Leontieva, Aneta
Lomovska (the project co-ordinator), from the Lithuanian
Free Market Institute (LMFI), Lithuania.
2. Maria Prohaska, Ivaylo Nikolov, from the Center for
the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria.
3. Ramil Pärdi, the Jaan Tonisson Institute, Estonia.
We are grateful for all the participants of the project for
sending us their materials, most of which are included in this
report.8
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The risks related to the functioning of pension funds will
be analysed from the point of view of a participant in the
new system  the future recipient of benefits [1]. We
assume that a risk is the probability of the emergence of a
situation in which the value of assets (collected premiums
and profits from investing them) on an individual pension
account is lower than the optimal level possible to attain.
The appearance of a risk results in the loss of real  due to
the drop in real value  and potential income of the benefit
recipient, and its appearance depends on various factors.
The broader the definition of risks, the more factors there
are involved. To identify risks, it is useful to divide them into
internal risks, which can be counteracted by a given fund,
and external risks, which the fund may be threatened by,
regardless of its actions [2].
The term "pension fund" used subsequently in the paper
denotes both an organisation managing the assets gathered
in the fund (in Polish terminology called a pension society)
and the fund itself, meaning the gathered assets, unless
issues are discussed that require the two to be precisely dif-
ferentiated.
1.1. External Risks
Analysing external risks against which a fund is unable to
work out the proper safeguards, the following risk factors
can be mentioned:
 weaknesses of reform implementation,
 political pressure on the investment decisions of pen-
sion funds,
 weakness of legal regulations, including the lack of
supervisory bodies or their badly defined role,
 weakness of the pension systems partners,
 underdeveloped capital markets,
 risk of interest rate changes,
 risk of foreign exchange rate changes, and
 risk of inflation.
Weaknesses in the implementation of pension reform
carry the danger of deviations from the programmed
pension system model that has been approved. This risk
may be caused by pressure from certain groups of interest.
If the public authorities are unable to resist that pressure,
the initial rules are abandoned and new ones introduced.
One example of applying pressure to change the approved
solutions in Poland involves demands to abandon the invest-
ment limits in force, and demands to introduce tax-related
benefits for organising the "third pillar" and participating in
it. When joining a fund is voluntary, tax-related benefits can
have a strong impact on increasing the motivation to partic-
ipate.
Another source of deviations from the approved pen-
sion model can involve changed political set-up as a
result of elections. This risk consists in generating new
legal regulations as a result of implementing different ideo-
logical concepts, as well as the policymakers striving for
short-term goals, e.g. resulting from a heavy budget deficit.
Though political risk is much greater in public pay-as-you-go
systems [3], it can also occur in the privately managed sec-
tion (of the pension system). In such cases, it is very impor-
tant to agree on the draft with the political opposition
before it becomes the subject of a parliamentary debate.
Deviation from the approved model of changes and
political pressure on the funds investment decisions are
dangerous external risks. On the one hand, they may seri-
ously shake social trust in the proposed reforms, while on
the other, such changes obviously arouse the distrust of pri-
vate organisations interested in taking part in pension fund
Part 1
Analysis of Risks Related to Pension Funds Operations
[1] It is possible to analyse the risk in other distinctions than, as proposed here, in dychotomic approach: the pension fund as the financial institu-
tion versus its members. For example, Turner (1996) proposes the analysis of risk bearing between pension fund, its sponsors, workers, employer and
government.
[2] Other approaches are also widely used. The risk in pension plans can be considered in three market areas: labour market, financial market, and
political market. Cf. Turner (1996).
[3] It is worth noting the great effort required for all the political forces and social partners to achieve a compromise when passing the law on pen-
sion funds in Poland [cf. Golinowska, Hausner, 1998].9
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management. Changes made during implementation may
also increase the cost of the new system.
The next important external factor is the lack of cohe-
sive legal regulations for pension funds, in particular the
improperly defined role of supervisory bodies.
First of all, the new institution of the pension system
may be badly placed in the existing system of supervisory
organisations. If the supervisory organisation is separate i.e.
only for pension funds, an unclear division of competence
between it and existing organisations for supervising other
players on the financial market is possible. Situations of
under-regulation may appear, for instance if the new super-
visory bodys range of competence does not include invest-
ment processes, while the Securities Commission  estab-
lished for such a purpose  considers itself relieved of the
duty of supervising pension funds in this respect. Another
example of vagueness in this area that is currently apparent
in Poland is supervision of employee pension programmes.
Wherever the form of the pension systems third pillar is
not an employee fund, then apart from the Office for Pen-
sion Fund Supervision (UNFE), there are two institutions
that can be authorised to supervise pension programmes.
These are the State Office for Insurance Supervision,
because these are life-insurance based programmes; and
the Securities and Exchanges Commission, because these
are investment-type programmes assigned to trust funds.
Secondly, dangerous situations can occur as a result of
the excessive "openness" of supervision regulation,
namely in assigning an important role to supervisory bodies
discretionary decisions, and/or accepting vague (insufficient-
ly specified) rules of action towards the funds. In the coun-
tries undergoing transformation it is especially important to
define precisely the rules for division of responsibilities and
to develop clear procedures. It seems that in a situation of
lack of experience and lack of systematic standards of
behaviour, under-regulation can be more dangerous than
excessive regulation. Moreover, in cases of under-regula-
tion, there is too much room for political pressuring and
political decision-making.
Another area of potential danger for pension funds
could be the weakness of partners operating in the
whole pension system. The issue here is the lack of co-
ordinated actions among institutions regulating and adminis-
trating the whole pension system, in both the public and pri-
vate sectors. The weaknesses in the pension systems pub-
lic part may result mainly from insufficient adaptation behav-
iour in situations when unexpected trends appear [4]. Lack
of preparedness for the possibility of difficult and unexpect-
ed situations leads to tension and undermines social trust in
the new system. In Poland, this risk appeared following
technical problems on the part of the Social Insurance
Company (ZUS) (the public pension institution) with trans-
ferring premiums to private pension funds [cf. Skrobisz,
1999].
In the area of private fund management companies, the
weakness may involve a tendency towards institutional oli-
gopoly, which leads to a lack of healthy competitive
behaviour under conditions of high barriers to entering the
retirement benefit market. This risk can appear especially at
a later period, after the pension fund market structure
forms and strengthens, when the fight for customers weak-
ens. The lack of competitive behaviour can also occur due
to over-regulation of the funds operations, e.g. through the
requirement for a minimum rate of return. Being long-term
savings organisations, pension funds can occasionally record
lower profitability than the required minimum for the whole
system. In a situation where the deficit is to be financed
from the assets of the management company, pension funds
 fearing infringement of their assets  often give up their
own long-term investment policy in favour of copying the
leaders.
One factor that effectively restricts pension fund man-
agement is under-development of the capital market.
This factor is especially important in the emerging markets,
which are undertaking to build new market institutions as
part of the transformation process. The experience of other
countries, such as Chile, shows that pension funds can con-
tribute to the development of those markets, but on the
condition that the market is prepared for absorbing a signif-
icant demand for financial instruments [5].
Good functioning is conditioned by the proper scale of
absorptiveness of the domestic capital market.
Experts estimate that in Poland, given the present state and
dynamics of development, the capital market will be able to
absorb the funds demand for securities in stock-exchange
trade for the next two to three years. It is very likely, how-
ever, that later on, in a situation where the number of avail-
able financial instruments is limited, pension funds will be
unable to invest effectively due to both the markets limited
size and the fixed portfolio structure (limits on investing in a
given instrument).
The capital markets development could be hampered not only
by the insufficient rate of privatisation but also due to the lack of reg-
ulation of some areas of the market. One example of such a draw-
back in Poland is the market for public trading of debt securities,
and corporate and municipal ones in particular [Koz³owski, 1999].
[4] In Hungary, excessive criticism of the old solutions caused the population to move towards private funds to a much greater degree than expect-
ed. This trend also appeared in Poland despite the greater level of safeguarding against it. In Kazakstan, participation in capital funds was made obliga-
tory for all insured persons, regardless of the fact that such a decision is simply unprofitable for people with a longer period of being insured.
[5] Vittas (1999) argues that if pension funds operate in a conductive regulatory framework, they have a beneficial interference on financial market
development. 10
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Areas that require proper market standardisation and
regulation for pension funds to be able to invest in them
include public infrastructure and real estate. Until there
appears the possibility of daily valuation of securities from
those markets (debt securities, debenture bonds, etc.),
pension funds will be unable to invest in them. In the case
of the real estate market, as yet unresolved ownership
issues are an additional difficulty delaying its regulation.
The under-development of the capital market is also
linked to lack of stability. No one needs convincing as to the
existence of this risk. Sudden changes in the prices of assets
undermine investment strategies.
The next external risk is the possibility of a downward
business cycle. Market analyses using different methods
and assumptions aim to minimise the risk of wrong deci-
sions, including those related to movement of share prices
on the stock exchange. However, this risk cannot be elimi-
nated completely.
The same is true for the risk of foreign exchange rate
changes (investments in foreign securities) and for the risk
of interest rate changes (investments in debt securities).
These risks are external elements that are an inseparable
feature of the investment process. One of the possible
strategies for limiting these risks is to purchase certain deriv-
ative instruments. However, this kind of safeguard is only
just forming on "young" capital markets. Decision-making in
the emerging markets thus carries a higher risk than on
developed capital markets.
Inflation is an important risk that carries substantial
weight in Central and Eastern European post-communist
countries. When inflation is high (a two-digit figure), a
rational and safe investment policy is seriously threat-
ened. In Poland, the single-digit scope of inflation (since
1998) enabled private companies to enter the "pension
industry". It should be noted that in the first half of the
1990s, in spite of serious discussions of experts on pen-
sion reform, private financial institutions could not be
counted on to get involved. This was mainly due to the
high inflation risk, which at that time was the greatest
barrier for private organisations participation in the new
system.
1.2. Internal Risks
There are three main areas of pension funds operations
where internal risks may occur, and these shall be analysed
here.
They are:
1) administrative (fund management),
2) social (rights of fund members), and
3) business operations.
1.2.1. Administrative Risks
Administrative risk concerns the organisation managing
the fund (the pension society). The risk may involve the
inability for conscientious and effective management of the
entrusted funds.
Inadequate administration of a pension funds resources
can be due to several factors. It may occur due to the man-
agement personnels low qualifications. With insuffi-
cient competence, especially in financial management, it is
hard to make accurate and sensible decisions.
The condition involving high qualifications is also related
to the issue of division of competence in the societys
management board. The division of tasks and responsibil-
ity should be clear and specific. This is made possible by,
among other things, internal decision-making procedures
(by-laws) leading to individual responsibility.
Another threat to the funds effective operations can be
a functional imbalance between actions for the bene-
fit of shareholders and those for the benefit of fund
participants. The pension society board has its clients 
fund members  on the one hand, but it also represents the
interests of the shareholders  founders of the society. The
latter may pressure the board to invest the funds resources
in projects related to their own business operations. This
kind of pressure may lead to engaging resources in projects
that do not bring profits to the funds participants, while
being a cheap source of capital for the societys founders. If
a pension societys board succumbs to pressuring, this will
be the beginning of unjustified transfers of assets between
the pension fund and the administrating company, or
between different programmes for different groups of par-
ticipants. 
Other potential risks threatening the interests of insured
persons might involve management take-over processes
and pension society consolidation, and finally the announce-
ment of a societys bankruptcy.
Moreover, the administration process may lack stan-
dards concerning financial matters, such standards that are
usually followed by institutions wanting to be perceived as
professional businesses. This risk could involve improperly
prepared financial reports and inadequate bookkeeping.
When such standards exist, the problem may lie in the fund
boards capacity to comply with them. Inadequacies in this
respect may lead to erroneous decisions, while on the other
hand, the funds financial situation can be purposely distort-
ed in the report system.
1.2.2. Social Risks
Social risks include endangering the rights of insured per-
sons in terms of participating in a fund or the worsening of
conditions of obtaining benefits. Social risks are not uniform.11
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Violation of the interests of insured persons can have a vari-
ety of aspects.
Firstly, the information reaching clients considering join-
ing a pension fund may be distorted. When wanting to
decide whether to participate, potential members of capital
funds are entitled to complete and reliable knowledge of
their rights and possible alternatives. Clear and honest infor-
mation should be provided both by the mass media and by
the person dealing with direct sales of retirement ser-
vices (the pension funds salesperson). Information provid-
ed by the media should not be misleading and should not
refer to other alternatives (funds) in the form of a negative
campaign. The key element, however, is a face-to-face
meeting between the client and the funds salesperson. Due
to the large degree of complexity of a pension funds func-
tioning, prospective clients often have to rely on the sales-
persons knowledge and advice. A salesperson, on the other
hand, may persuade clients to join the fund without having
their genuine interests at heart. This occurs, for instance,
when a commission-based motivation system that focuses
only on signing up new members is used with salespeople.
If, in addition, a salesperson is attached only briefly to the
pension fund, there exists the possibility of falsifying data on
fund membership.
A risk that can directly strike fund participants is the lack
of standards safeguarding the participants interests
when entering into an agreement with the pension
fund. The source of this lies in the asymmetry of informa-
tion between the funds agent and the prospective client
concerning possible solutions. The risk appears when the
agreements on pension fund membership are vague or
ambiguous. A person joining a fund may wrongly understand
the agreements unclear content, while comparing alterna-
tives when making a choice is difficult if there are no stan-
dards on the contents of agreements.
In the event of a disadvantageous financial situation, a
fund may strive to change the terms of the agreement in
order to reduce participants future claims. Thus, social risk
may appear in the way changes are made to the pen-
sion agreement that could be detrimental to the funds
members.
Unequal treatment of fund participants may also emerge
in the form of unequal division of income from the
funds investments. Invested resources generate an
income whose distribution may turn out to be dispropor-
tionate in relation to each members contribution. Then, a
given group of insured persons would gain more from the
income generated by investment than others.
Equally important are limitations related to switching
fund membership. We know from experience that unlimit-
ed client freedom leads to high administration costs due to
a high rate of insured persons fluctuation. Restrictions for
participants should be minimised, however, and should be as
uniform as possible for all the funds.
In a fund that not only increases the resources obtained
from premiums but also pays out benefits once members
reach retirement age, there is the possibility of the risk of
paying out lower benefits in a given fund compared to
others. The social risk lies in the fact that a fund participant
comparing the benefits received by other persons with sim-
ilar social status and a similar pre-retirement career may
consider their own pension to be too low. Of course the
sources of this type of danger are found in other areas,
mainly in the level of fund management costs or investment
policy effectiveness. One should remember, though, that if
such remissness is excessive, this could lead to a strong
social reaction expressed in a sense of losing out in relation
to other benefit recipients from the private system.
1.2.3. Risks Related to the Funds Business
Operations
In analysing the economic aspects of risk, we will
focus on the following two areas:
1) the investment process,
2) the funds day-to-day operations.
Investment risk stems from the nature of a pension
funds operations, consisting in increasing the collected
resources in the long term [6]. Obviously, in view of chang-
ing market conditions, investment operations of any organi-
sation on the capital market carry a risk.
The primary risk in the investment process is a funds
low profitability, which means the fund has not worked
out the optimal profitability rate that it is possible to attain
under a given set of conditions. It should be noted that we
are talking about optimal profitability, namely that which is
possible in the current market situation. 
Another approach involves relative profitability  com-
pared to other funds. Leaving aside the criterion of evalua-
tion here, this risk means that a fund generates lower
income than is possible to achieve.
Errors in managing a pension funds resources may result
from, for example, the lack of professional market
analyses. Here again we touch on the issue of suitably high
qualifications, which are essential in fund management. A
bad or incomplete analysis of the market and the appropri-
ate instruments may lead to another threat, namely an inap-
propriate investment strategy. Diversification of the
investment portfolio for a given rate of return may be
[6] According to Turner (1996), the capital market risks are grouped in the following groups: financial market risk, risk due to malfeasance, infla-
tion risk, interest rate risk, risk due to the financial performance of the plan sponsor.12
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both too "risky" (when the risk is underestimated) or too
conservative (when the estimated risk is greater than the
real risk). The issue here is on what scale the pension funds
will invest in company shares, and what part will be invest-
ed in debt instruments.
It is worth noting that the reference point in risk diver-
sification comprises not only the level of investment risk
but also the period of investment. A funds investment
policy should take into consideration the interests of the
funds members, which may be mutually exclusive. For a
young employee whose prospects for membership in the
fund span several decades, a policy of greater investment
in shares will be more appropriate. As we know, in devel-
oped capital markets the rate of return on such invest-
ments in the long term is greater than it is on bonds. For
an older person, with a dozen or so years membership,
such portfolio diversification could be too risky, and may
cause a given person to sustain losses due to the possibili-
ty of short-term fluctuations.
The risk of investing in preferred projects or
investments recommended by the shareholders of
the company managing the fund has already been dis-
cussed, but it is worth mentioning here as well, as it is one
of the fundamental dangers that could potentially lead to
low investment effectiveness. One could say that it
includes all the analysed dimensions: economic, social and
administrative.
The last area of risk in investment operations involves
bad management from the point of view of liquidity. In
the investment phase of a fund, the main element of uncer-
tainty is the scale of predicted payments into the fund and
the period of undisturbed inflow of premiums. Maintaining
the proper level of liquidity is more important in the phase
of paying out benefits, which is delineated by the members
retirement age. Analyses from the point of view of the liq-
uidity criterion are also important for the funds investment
policy (purchasing various financial instruments). This is
because such structures of engagement of resources are
possible that limit the flexible introduction of favourable
changes, which in turn reduces the effectiveness of the
investment policy. The purchase of "bad" packages (similar
to "bad debts" in the banking system) can also be detrimen-
tal to liquidity. In the emerging markets, the possibility of
selling inconvenient securities is probably more limited.
As we have mentioned, investment operations are not
the only area where economic risks can occur. A separate
area comprises those factors of day-to-day operations that
have a negative impact on the funds financial condition.
Firstly, this can be a vague division of assets between
the society (management company) and the pension
fund. If the funds finances are not clearly separated from
the management companys, shareholders in the pension
society or shareholders in its founding organisations may file
claims on the resources of the pension fund, which is imper-
missible. Such shortcomings may result in the risk of
resources of fund participants being taken over (by
somebody else).
The high costs of fund management, in effect leading
to decreased retirement benefits, can be a dangerous trend.
From the point of view of a pension fund participant, fund
management costs are determined by two factors. The first
is the level of fees and commission received for man-
aging the fund. It seems that in the countries undergoing
transformation, where there is still a deficit of qualifications
in investment advisory services, these costs may lead to a
somewhat high level of administrative fees, despite exten-
sive competition on the retirement services market in its
early period.
The second element that could carry the risk of high
management costs involves external costs, or transfers
made from the pension fund to other financial institutions
for specialist services, e.g. to a bank where the funds
resources are deposited or to the company maintaining a
register of fund members. Firstly, services ordered by the
pension society may be performed improperly or incom-
pletely, which increases costs and has a negative impact
on the funds profitability. Secondly, the transfer of
resources could be disproportionate in relation to the
cost of the services.
The final risk in day-to-day operations comprises weak-
nesses in the proper valuation of assets. The value of
assets, and especially the value of a participation unit in a
pension fund, is one of the important elements taken into
account when choosing a pension fund.
1.3. Ranking of Identified Risks
Though the presented description of risks points to the
main danger areas in the functioning of the funds, it does not
show which of these areas are the most important in the
countries under consideration. That is why experts from the
countries taking part in the study specified such risk groups
using a point method of risk grading.
Each risk area was to be allocated a degree of danger.
For this purpose, a five-degree scale of risk was chosen,
expressed in assigned points, in decreasing order. This
means that "1" marks those areas in the functioning of a pen-
sion fund that carry the greatest risk. Consequently, "5" was
assigned to those risks that are of minimum importance.
Moreover, it was decided that in those areas where the
degree of risk is 4 or 5, there is no need to develop special
remedial measures. On the other hand, in areas where the
degree of risk is higher (1  3) a more in-depth analysis will
be necessary, leading to the development of specific safe-
guards (instruments).13
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In the countries covered by the analysis  Bulgaria, Esto-
nia, Lithuania and Poland  the risk most dangerous to the
funds functioning was perceived to be the lack of cohesive
legal regulations, and erroneously defined functions of the
supervisory body (1 point). The risk of lack of competitive
behaviour on the part of pension funds was also considered
important, especially in the context of a lack of reliable
information on a funds financial situation (2 points). Areas
where the degree of danger was considered moderate (3
points) included under-development of the capital market, a
downward business cycle, and weakness of the financial
institutions providing services to pension funds. The other
groups of external risks, including political risk or instability
of the domestic currency (inflation), were seen to be unim-
portant.
In considering the dangers from internal risks, the evalu-
ations are harsher than those described above. This is espe-
cially true for economic operations and members rights
(social risks). In economic operations, the areas considered
the most burdened with risk (1 point) are as many as five:
 inappropriate diversification of the portfolio from the
point of view of risk,
 inappropriate diversification of the portfolio from the
point of view of the insured persons interests,
 investing in investments suggested by the pension soci-
etys (management companys) shareholders,
 improper valuation of the funds assets, and
 ambiguous rules for separating the assets of the soci-
ety from the assets of the pension fund.
The risk of inaccurate analyses and financial planning as
well as the danger of losing financial liquidity (the risk of
investing in difficult-to-sell instruments) was also seen as
highly probably (2 points). A moderate value was given to
two kinds of economic risk: high management costs and for-
eign exchange rate risk (3 points). In the case of Poland, this
last area was the only one given four points among eco-
nomic operations. There was no risk in the economic oper-
ations category that received the lowest mark of five points.
In the social area, or that concerning the rights of per-
sons participating in a pension fund, the most dangerous
areas were: (1) the lack of standards protecting the clients
interests at the moment of signing the agreement and (2)
the way changes are made to that agreement, which could
lead to losses for the client. The other groups of dangers
(restrictions on switching to another fund and the unequal
distribution of income from investment operations) were
also considered important (2 points). The only exception is
the risk of discriminating against certain social groups in
terms of access to participation in a fund, which was seen as
being moderate. This seems apt, mainly because this kind of
risk is not very probable in countries where the capital pil-
lar of pensions is introduced as an obligatory element.
In the area of pension fund management, the experts
thought that the greatest risk was the excessive involve-
ment of the pension society management in operations
other than the functions for the benefit of pension fund
members. Thus, the main danger is pressure on the pension
society management from its shareholders. The other
administrative areas, except the risk of ambiguous division
of tasks and responsibilities, were also assessed as being
dangerous. There were no weak marks (4 or 5 points) in
the group of administrative risks.
One should note that the overall assessment, which
sums up the experts evaluations in the analysed countries,
was significantly different in some areas than the view taken
by experts from Poland. This was especially true for assess-
ment of the danger from external risks, where the differ-
ences in evaluation were the greatest. Contrary to the over-
all assessment, most of the external conditions were con-
sidered important in the case of Poland (1 to 2 points).
Apart from bad legal regulations, the factors considered the
most disadvantageous included the public pension systems
inefficiency and high inflation (1 point). Also considered
"dangerous" are the badly defined role of supervision, the
lack of healthy competition between the funds in winning
clients, under-development of the capital market, and its
instability (2 points). In evaluating the situation in Poland,
there was no external factor that was perceived as being
moderate, while the other groups were seen as unimpor-
tant. For internal risks, the differences were small, not
exceeding one point, and consequently will not be
described in detail.
It seems that the distance in evaluations of external risks
between Poland and the other countries is the effect of
longer experience due to the earlier introduction of pension
reform. Just under a year from the enactment of the main
regulations allowing private pension funds to be established
(from 1 January 1999), a number of shortcomings were
observed in Poland, which will be discussed later (cf. part
7.1. of this report). Among the greatest dangers for the
funds functioning in Poland is the lack of flexible action in
the public system. This is an important conclusion from Pol-
ish experience for those countries where the funds are just
beginning to operate and where unpredicted, external
weaknesses of reform have not revealed themselves yet.
The above analysis of risks of pension funds shows how
many factors, both external and within the funds themselves,
can threaten the interests of future benefit recipients. In addi-
tion, taking into account the necessity to gain public trust in
the new pension system institutions, including pension funds,
it is necessary to create a set of solutions that will protect the
funds from the emergence of these risks. These instruments
are particularly important when capital funds appear as an
obligatory part of the reformed pension system.14
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The analysis of potential risks in pension fund opera-
tions, presented in the first chapter, has shown the most
important danger areas for effective operation. These risks
have been presented as potential risks, as they do not have
to emerge if the proper instruments are included in the new
pension system. These instruments basic function is to min-
imise the risks of participating in private pension funds. The
issue here is not only about legal safeguards aimed at estab-
lishing state supervision over private pension funds, but also
the development of self-regulation mechanisms.
This part of the report will present the possible, basic
kinds of instruments safeguarding against the emergence of
risks in the functioning of pension funds. These instruments
play a varied role in individual phases of introducing the new
pension system. Some are of key importance at the design
stage of the new pension system model, up to the moment
when the necessary legal regulations are passed, while oth-
ers are important when the new system is started up. Oth-
ers still gain importance with the passage of time as new
solutions consolidate.
Taking into account the as yet modest experience of
pension reform in Central and Eastern European countries,
one can identify the following kinds of instruments that
correspond to the identified risks in pension funds opera-
tions:
 The first kind of instrument involves education on
securing income for old age. The target of such educa-
tion is both the population as a whole and different groups
of participants in the pension system. Such education in the
countries undergoing transformation plays an important
role in the understanding and acceptance of the system
changes. The aim is to deal with false ideas about the way
old-age pensions are financed, show the need for individual
saving and describe future dangers that giving up the
reforms could lead to. Moreover, thanks to a public debate
on the new institutions  pension funds and the companies
(pension societies) managing them  people are growing
accustomed to new solutions. It is furthermore possible to
gain full social confidence in the new institutions, as well as
social control by introducing solutions correctly.
Equally important is more thorough education of partic-
ipants in the pension system: employers as payers of premi-
ums, employees  represented by trade unions for example,
benefit recipients represented by pensioner organisations,
prospective shareholders in the pension societies managing
the pension funds, and administrators of the public pension
system. One important element is to show both the good
and bad experiences of other countries. These experiences
should be comprehensively demonstrated, with the partici-
pation of experts who, thanks to their personal status and
attitude, are reliable.
It is also important to supply solid knowledge on the
pension systems and reforms to the participants of
the legislative process. Considering both the election
cycle (the fact that legislative authorities have a specified
term in office) and the inertia of previous solutions, espe-
cially in the social area, the reforms authors need to con-
vince [legislators] of the need to introduce changes, as well
as ensuring these changes are passed. With this aim in mind,
it seems essential to educate both ministry officials, who ini-
tiate new acts of law, and deputies and senators (especially
those working on the acts in the appropriate committees),
so that they respect the logic of the presented draft in their
legislative work and do not succumb to pressure from
groups of interest or to populist demands from certain
employee groups.
The education of the media community, journalists
and columnists who are responsible for the way the new
concepts are presented (to the public) is impossible to
overestimate. This presentation needs to be reliable and
comprehensible. Moreover, it should promote the future
benefits of introducing the reforms  not only the benefits
related to individual pension levels, but also those related to
the stability and solvency of the system as a whole. Good
economic education of the public is the preliminary condi-
tion for the reforms success. This instrument is most
important in the first phase, when the new pension system
is being designed, and during the process of its passage.
 The publics education is linked to promotion of the
new system solutions. Promotional activity differs from
social education in that the former is conducted at the sec-
ond stage of reform, when the structure of the new pension
system is already decided. The target of the promotional
activity is broad public opinion, to which the reform pro-
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gramme is addressed. In most cases this means the working
population. Promotional campaigns can be carried out by
various entities, both public authorities responsible for
reform implementation (in Poland, the Government Repre-
sentative for Social Security Reform) and the Office of
Supervision, as well as the new emergent institutions (pri-
vate pension funds). Thanks to promotion based on solid
information it is possible not only to familiarise people with
the new pension system but also to prepare the funds
prospective clients for making the decision to participate.
 Another important group of tools safeguarding against
risk includes the developed legal regulations that form
the basis for pension funds operations. Legal regulations
make it possible to prevent risks, especially internal ones.
For example, a legal structure of the funds that clearly
separates the fund as the collected assets of its participants
from the pension society as the management company
allows for greater protection of the gathered resources of
fund participants. Also important are the legal require-
ments for prospective fund founders, which usually set
tight conditions for entering the market. The law also speci-
fies the conditions for the management of the funds finances
 day-to-day operations, investment activities and so on.
It is important the passed acts of law form a cohesive
whole. This means that the regulations should provide a
good platform for introducing the pension funds into the
existing legal and economic system. It is worth adding that
developing cohesive laws is a dynamic process and will be
especially intensive in the reforms initial period. It will not
lose importance later, though, because regulations require
continuous adaptation to new situations.
 Once acts of law have been passed, there comes the
important process of forming new pension system insti-
tutions. In Central European countries, the supervisory
body is usually established first, and then the pension funds.
When establishing the supervisory body, the important
issue is whether it will be a specialised body supervising only
the retirement services market, or linked to supervision
over the whole financial services sector. It is also important
whether or not the supervisory body is politically and finan-
cially independent, namely to which institution it is
responsible to for its actions, and what the sources are of
its budget revenue. A certain role is also played by the
procedure of the supervisory body in obtaining its regu-
lations from its superior organisation, and the election
method (the appointment of the supervisory bodys
chairman).
When establishing pension funds, one essential process
is that of obtaining a licence for the pension society manag-
ing the pension fund and registering the funds in the appro-
priate registers.
 The nature of the control and supervision over the
whole pension fund system by a specialised institution
is determined mainly by the legal regulations, which give
that body the appropriate competence. However, the prac-
tice and effectiveness of supervision is also influenced by
other factors, including the pension funds capacity for rep-
resenting their interests.
Polish experiences show that besides the operation of
pension funds, the other important area for supervision is
the systems public segment. Supervision over the public
system is especially important when it is responsible for col-
lecting the whole of the premium and transferring the
appropriate share to the funds.
 Developing professional and ethical operational
standards. Besides complying with existing laws, the pen-
sion funds develop their own standards of conduct, which
may be accepted and obeyed by all the market players. In
civilised market economies, various procedures or rules of
conduct (for accounting or customer service) are obvious
and are obeyed  these are standards developed from years
of experience. The funds will usually comply with them
because they want to be perceived as professional institu-
tions. In the countries undergoing transformation, however,
many standards of conduct do not function yet, likewise
even in the area of pension funds.
 Self-regulation in areas of healthily competitive
behaviour. It can be expected that in specified situations,
competition among the funds in order to gain clients will act
as an instrument safeguarding against risks. This is especial-
ly true of the period of promoting new solutions, when
most people to whom the reform programme is addressed
will be deciding about joining a pension fund.
However, taking into account that the market for pri-
vate pensions is a market with tight entrance restrictions,
there may appear trends towards oligopolistic behaviour,
neglecting the interest of fund members. This can occur
particularly in the latter period. Restrictions on switching to
a different pension fund can lead to this.16
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The instruments, or tools, presented in the previous
chapter form general guidelines. They are far from a
ready-to-use arrangement for a specific country. The
appropriateness and effectiveness of specific solutions
largely depends on factors that characterise a given coun-
trys situation: its level of economic development, the
populations affluence, traditions of business culture and
co-operation, etc. The safe and effective operation of
pension funds in a given country requires a proper set of
tools that do not necessarily have to be universal, but
whose deviation from the general rules should not be so
numerous as to change the basic mechanism of the instru-
ments functioning. And if these deviations do occur, they
should be rationally justified.
When constructing these instruments, the legislator
faces many dilemmas. These may result from the contradic-
tion between the goals of the systems new institutions and
the tasks of the instruments used to safeguard against risks.
We have identified the following dilemmas that need to be
resolved in order to ensure a sound basis for the funds func-
tioning:
 The first dilemma involves the conflict between
social goals and effectiveness goals. For private pen-
sion funds, the main criterion of operation is effective-
ness aimed at achieving the optimal rate of growth of
invested resources under given conditions. This does
involve a risk, however. For the state, on the other hand,
the funds safety and stability is important, due to the
desired social acceptance of the reform. Administrative
or legal limitations  most often used towards investment
policies  mean that the scale of operations is limited,
which reduces in turn the funds profitability. This price is
much higher when the capital pillar is obligatory, because
then, as mentioned above, supervision by the state is
stricter.
 The second issue concerns the character of pension
fund supervision. Taking into account the experiences of
other countries, two models can be identified. Supervision
over the funds can be reactive, when it acts in emergency
situations and assumes greater independence of operation
for the funds. One can say that it emphasises a more spon-
taneous development of the pension sector. Active super-
vision, on the other hand, anticipates any serious deviations
on the part of the funds and undertakes day-by-day moni-
toring of practically all the funds actions. In this option, the
scope of regulation is broader, and we observe strong pre-
rogatives for the supervising body.
The countries undergoing transformation may be
encouraged to use the active model due to the lack of stan-
dards for administrative procedures and financial manage-
ment, as well as the lack of ethical standards of conduct (e.g.
a code of ethics for customer service). The reactive option,
on the other hand, can be supported by the argument of
ethical, i.e. careful, treatment of the developing, early retire-
ment market, which could be "suffocated" by inflexible legal
regulations hampering its development.
 One of the key elements for effective operation of
pension funds is the nature of relations between pri-
vate pension funds and the supervisory body. In prac-
tice, let us mention two possible variations of co-opera-
tion. The first involves close co-operation in taking up dis-
putable issues and reaching a joint position. The second
scenario assumes a conflict of interests and methods of
operation. The pension societies, through their represen-
tatives, develop an alternative position and make use of
lobbying (in parliament, for instance) to force through
their own solutions. It seems that the former scenario
ensures to a greater degree that operations will be safe
and more effective.
 Also important is how the relations develop between
funds themselves, especially in competing for participants.
This is expressed in the way they carry out advertising
campaigns. It seems there are two optional modes of
action. The first involves honest and rational competition,
with reliable information on the terms of participation in a
fund, the financial results and management costs. The sec-
ond possible option involves unethical competition, intro-
ducing aggressive means of persuasion, without offering full
information, and showing other funds in a negative light. As
we mentioned above, a funds promotion should be carried
out in a rational way.
 Another problem for funds efficient operation is the
nature of the financial policy implemented. Should it be
bolder and more risky, which means engaging the portfolio
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more seriously in publicly traded shares, for instance, or
should it be a conservative policy investing most of the
resources in state debt securities?
 The previous issue is also linked to the range of
possible investments in foreign securities. This is not
just a technical problem. In stable Western markets the
investment risk is much lower than on the undeveloped
markets in the countries undergoing transformation. Thus
it is in the interest of the new systems participants to have
the majority of a funds resources engaged in securities
issued abroad. However, pension funds are a stimulator of
the domestic capital markets development and of the
level of investments in the economy. That is why the pub-
lic authorities will work towards limiting investments
abroad in the interest of the economy and to stimulate the
development of the domestic capital market. Which is
more important: the interests of insured persons, or
the interest of the economy as a whole? This dilemma
is pointed out by Nikolas Barr in his analysis of the reforms
undertaken in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
[Barr, 1999].
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Previously, we considered the areas where risks appear
in pension funds and what instruments can be used to coun-
teract those risks. In this chapter we shall attempt to answer
the question: What instruments can be used to counteract
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Balanced Supervision of Pension Funds
Table 4.1. External risks and instruments in the functioning of pension funds
  Risks   Instruments
  Weaknesses in reform implementation   Social education of experts, politicians and mass media
  Political pressure on the funds investment decisions   Systemic and legal solutions separating politics from
business
  Weakness of legal regulations in force, the lack of
supervisory bodies or their badly defined role
  Educating policy-makers
  Information about solutions used in other countries
  Taking into account the possibility of the supervisory
body undertaking legislative initiatives
  Amending regulations aimed at effective supervision
  Weakness of institutions administrating the pension
system, including the public sector (ZUS)
  Legal regulations
  Integral supervision over the pension system
  Weakness of institutions in the financial sector (the
depository bank, other institutions)
  Legal regulations
  Business ethics
  Supervision of the financial sector
  Under-development of capital markets   Consistent privatisation
  Developing new financial instruments
  Risk of interest rate changes   Developing new financial instruments
  Risk of foreign exchange changes   Consistent anti-inflation policy and good
  High inflation   macroeconomic policies
Table 4.2. Risks and instruments in the administrative area of pension funds
  Risks   Instruments
  Low management personnel qualifications leading to
bad management
  Requirement for the proper managerial qualifications in
the licensing process
  Supervisory action
  Unclear division of competence   Requirement for internal division of responsibilities
  Professional standards of conduct for the funds
  Functional imbalance between actions benefiting
pension society shareholders and fund participants
  Regulations safeguarding against conflicts of function
  Requirement of the clear separation of the assets of the
fund and the society (management company)
  Supervisory actions of a state institution
  Improper accounting and/or weaknesses in enforcing
existing standards
  A framework chart of accounts specified by law
  Professional standards of conduct for the funds
  Independent audit19
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effectively the risks to pension funds functioning, while tak-
ing care not to stifle the funds proactive and effective
behaviour with excessive regulations and supervision?
Each group of risks has been analysed separately and the
appropriate tools for combating them have been listed.
Let us start by analysing the external risks. It seems that
in most cases, elements of social education and the devel-
opment of good and cohesive legal regulations will be good
instruments (cf. Table 4.1). Educating experts and politicians
can prevent political risk, and help in developing efficient
solutions and a well-placed role for state supervision over
the funds. The key element will involve skilfully using the
experience of other countries and developing ones own
model of changes.
The risk of administrators weaknesses damaging the
pension fund system can be avoided thanks to good regula-
tions, including those that guarantee efficient supervision
over the public sector institution and the organisation that
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Table 4.3. Risks and instruments in the social functioning of pension funds
  Risks   Instruments
  Inadequate or untrue information about the terms of
participating in a fund
  Educating salespersons
  Requirement of qualifications confirmed by an exam
  The possibility of clients filing complaints against a fund
  Professional standards of conduct
  Code of ethics
  Lack of standards safeguarding the interests of
participants when signing an agreement with a pension
fund
  Educating the shareholders
  Professional standards of conduct
  Code of ethics
  Methods of changing the terms of the agreement
undefined or defined to the participants detriment
  Requirement of access to information on the financial
consequences to the participant of the proposed changes
  The possibility of filing a complaint to the supervisory
body against the funds functioning
  Limitations on switching funds   Regulations ensuring the possibility of leaving a fund
  The possibility of filing a complaint against the funds
functioning to the supervisory body
  Discriminating against or in favour of specified groups
of participants
  Requirement of criteria of participation defined by law
  The possibility of filing a complaint against the funds
functioning to the supervisory body
Table 4.4. Risks and instruments in the economic activity of pension funds
  Risks   Instruments
  In the investment process
  Low effectiveness   Self-regulation through competitive behaviour
  Requirement of covering the deficit from the
management companys resources
  Improper policy of investment portfolio diversification   Legal requirement to invest in specified financial
instruments
  Guaranteed minimum rate of return
  Investing in the management companys own projects
or in recommended investments
  A ban or significant restrictions on such solutions
  Supervisory actions
  Lack of financial liquidity   Developed standards of safe conduct
  In day-to-day operations
  Flow of resources breaking into the funds assets for
the benefit of shareholders
  Requirement of clear separation of the funds and
management companys assets
  Supervisory actions
  High costs of fund management   Self-regulation through competitive behaviour
  Improper valuation of assets   Legal regulations on valuation
  Supervisory actions
  Professional standards of conduct20
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transfers premiums to the private pillar (in Poland  the
Social Insurance Institution, ZUS). In the countries of our
region, given the under-development of the capital market
consistent and decisive privatisation of further state proper-
ty is essential.
It seems, however, that in view of most administrative
risks, good regulations and an effective supervisory body are
the essential condition (cf. Table 4.2). The risks of the man-
agement boards low qualifications and the lack of clear
decision-making rules can be eradicated by defining the con-
ditions that need to be met, especially at the moment when
the fund starts operating. The risk of an imbalance in the
managements actions for the benefit of fund participants
and management company founders requires constant and
active supervision.
There is also room for the funds to develop standards
[themselves] (e.g. on the issue of the management company
boards high qualifications). The problem of improper
accounting can be secured by way of obligatory legislative
solutions, but also based on developed standards. The
requirement for an independent audit is conducive to com-
pliance with the principles of reliability.
In the area of social risks, for which Table 4.3 lists the
appropriate instruments, we find mixed solutions. Because
these risks directly concern a fund member, the possibility
of filing a complaint with the supervisory body is a new
instrument not presented earlier. Actions taken on the ini-
tiative of the supervisory body alone do not seem sufficient.
When considering a clients access to reliable informa-
tion, the decisive instrument will be not so much effective
supervision, but rather a code of ethics and standards of
conduct. If such standards are lacking, it is possible to use
the legal requirement of a state exam to be passed by agents
offering fund membership, which should partly eliminate
persons ill-equipped for the job.
The instruments for economic risks are presented
below in Table 4.4. In this, the last area of the analysis, the
list of risks and instruments is different again. The proper
instrument counteracting a relatively low profitability in
relation to other funds involves, on the one hand, competi-
tive stimuli on the market and, on the other, legal solutions
guaranteeing the interests if insured persons (covering a
deficit in resources from the pension societys [management
companys] assets). The reaction to improper diversification
of investment risk can be legal requirements (investment
limits) and effective supervision over the funds investment
operations. For the risk involving liquidity of assets, it is suf-
ficient to take advantage of the standards of conduct of
financial institutions that are experienced in operating on the
domestic capital market.
In day-to-day operations, the risk of unjustified transfers
from the fund to the pension society has to be protected by
good legal solutions and effective supervision. It seems that
in the operating costs, self-regulation through competitive
behaviour is an effective tool, especially since cost levels can
be an important element when new participants choose a
pension fund. On the other hand, control of cost levels by
law or through administrative measures would seriously
limit the autonomy of making any kind of decision.
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Introduction
Pension funds, or institutions whose function it is to col-
lect and invest resources securing incomes for old age,
were established earlier than public pension systems. Many
well-known companies created pension systems for their
work force in the early 19th century at the time of the
industrial revolution. By securing their employees old age,
employers were implementing a development mission.
With time, when public systems developed widely in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, occupational pension
schemes became of secondary importance. They became
part of what we call the second pillar. The importance of
occupational pension schemes decreased even more in the
late 20th century. They became part of the third pillar of
securing income for old age. The second pillar is made up of
general capital solutions.
Pension funds today can be found in both the second
and third pillars. These are usually institutions under private
management that invest collected pension premiums. The
premiums are voluntary or obligatory for participants, paid
individually or collectively, transferred to the fund directly
or via some other institution (financial or administrative).
The legal status of pension funds varies. Thus, there are
mutual insurance organisations, closed life-insurance organ-
isations, non-profit organisations, and increasingly frequent-
ly today  joint stock companies. At the end of the 20th cen-
tury there has been a tendency to standardise the legal for-
mula of pension funds. The model for this standardisation is
based on the solutions that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s
in Latin America. Supervision over pension funds is also tak-
ing on a universal character, even though in specific solutions,
there are still differences that grew out of local traditions.
5.1. Experiences of Latin American
Countries
This section, devoted to the region of Latin America,
consists of two basic points. The first provides an overview
of both the development of pension reforms and the provi-
sions applied in their supervision. The second point discuss-
es the institutional aspects of pension supervision in Latin
American countries.
5.1.1. The Development of Pension Funds in Latin
America
Interest in pension funds in Latin America results from
the fact that they are an important aspect of the widespread
securing of income for old age, and in some countries have
replaced the public system. This is therefore not a supple-
ment to expansive, pay-as-you-go public financed systems,
but a segment of the same if not greater importance than
the public segment. 
Why is it that, particularly in the countries of Latin
America, the public and pay-as-you-go pension system is
being replaced increasingly widely with a capital-based, pri-
vately managed system? Simplifying the issue a little, one can
point to two important reasons. The first was linked to the
poor condition of public systems, unbalanced and "dam-
aged" by political decisions. As Jose Pi¼era, the author of the
reform in Chile, said, "We built the new system on the ruins
of the old one" (1996). The second reason was linked to the
modernising mission of a new generation of politicians in
Latin America, as pension funds became a source of capital
for the development of domestic investments.
Pension reforms in Latin America went in three direc-
tions. Today we can say there are three new model solu-
tions [Mesa-Lago and Kleinjans, 1997]. The criterion differ-
entiating these models involves the proportions and rela-
tions between the public system (pillar one) and the newly
established pension funds (pillar two).
The first model is a substitutive model. It involves com-
pletely or largely replacing the old system with the new one.
This was the road taken by Chile (1981), Bolivia (1997), El
Salvador (1997) and Mexico (1997).
The second is a mixed model, consisting of introducing
the new segment while diminishing the old one. However,
both segments still exist. This road was taken by Argentina
(1994) and Uruguay (1996).
The third model is a parallel model. This means that
pension funds appeared independently of the public system
CASE Reports No. 36
Part 5
The Practice of Supervision Applied in Other Countries22
Stanis³awa Golinowska, Piotr Kurowski (eds.)
reform. They develop as an alternative, and as competition
for the public system. This was the road taken by Peru
(1993) and Colombia (1994).
Despite the varied methods of reforming the pension
system in Latin America, their common element is the high
degree of universalism in the construction of pension funds
as institutions. As these are privately managed organisations
and at the same time ones replacing a large part of the pub-
lic systems, they are subject to relatively strong supervision.  
The choice of reform strategy had a significant impact on
the development possibilities of pension funds. The data in
Table 5.1 show that Argentina and Mexico have the largest
number of currently operating funds (14). The largest number
of fund participants is also in those countries. However, one
has to consider the fact that these countries have relatively
large populations. The calculations in the table show how var-
ied the average number of participants per fund is. The volume
of assets gathered by the funds is greatly influenced by the
degree of a systems maturity. One case in point is Chile,
where the reform was carried out more than a decade earlier.
The assets of funds operating in Chile account for more than
half the resources amassed in all the countries under analysis.
The funds investment policies are mostly determined by
the applicable limits specified by law. On the other hand, the
low degree of development of the capital markets is a strong
limitation.
That is why funds in the great majority of countries in
the region invest mainly in securities issued by the state sec-
tor. Mexico is a typical example, where investments in com-
pany shares are not permitted yet, and close to 95% of
assets are invested in the state sector (cf. Table 5.2). Peru-
vian funds are an exception, as they invest most of their
assets in the company sector. Another significant area of
investment is that of securities issued by financial institutions
(e.g. bank certificates of deposit), accounting for 25% to
over 30% of assets.
Detailed analyses of investment limits show that in
practice, the upper limits set by law are frequently not
reached by pension funds. This is the case, for
instance, in Argentina, Chile and Peru, as illustrated in
Table 5.3.
As can be seen from the figures, restrictions do not nec-
essarily require the aggregated amount to coincide with the
legal upper limit. Also, individual funds usually establish
CASE Reports No. 36
Table 5.1. Latin America: Pension funds in reformed pension systems of selected countries (June 1999)
  Country   Starting Date   Number of
pension funds
  Number of
affiliates
(thousands)




  Fund assets
(USD
thousands)
  Argentina   May 1994   14   7,475.2   533.9   13,861.2
  Bolivia   May 1997   2   448.9   224.5   380.7
  Chile   May 1981   8   5,996.0   749.5   33,245.9
  Colombia   April 1994   8   3,181.8   397.7   2,476.0
  Costa Rica   August 1995   8   113.3   14.2   120.3
  Mexico   February 1997   14   14,622.2   1,044.4   8,821.9
  Peru   June 1993   5   2,106.5   421.3   2,082.5
  El Salvador   April 1998   5   670.1   134.0   118.2
  Uruguay   September 1995   6   15.0   2.5   476.9
Source: FIAP (1999)
Table 5.2. Portfolio composition in selected countries of Latin America (June 1999)











  Argentina   100.0   52.8   19.6   25.4   0.3   1.9   -
  Bolivia   100.0   66.6   -   29.4   -   4.0   -
  Chile   100.0   37.3   18.6   31.6   12.4   0.1   -
  Mexico   100.0   94.7   2.7   -   -   -   2.6
  Peru   100.0   6.5   93.3   -   -   -   0.2
  El Salvador   100.0   68.7   -   31.3   -   -   -
  Uruguay   100.0   63.9   6.4   25.0   -   4.7   -
Source: FIAP (1999)23
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lower-than-legal upper limits of their own, to avoid incur-
ring the costs of asset liquidation when changes in the port-
folio are required.  Another reason for the lower-than-legal
limits in Argentina is that the supervisor values the funds,
and, in exceptional cases, this may result in differences
between official prices and those assumed by the pension-
fund managers.
Guarantees 
Guarantees in the new pension systems are aimed main-
ly at safeguarding fund members against the risk of the
funds bankruptcy, and consequently against the risk of los-
ing their benefit payments. On the other hand, in the case
of people not covered by the fund system (e.g. the poor and
the homeless) or those who will be unable to make a suffi-
cient contribution towards their pension (e.g. the unem-
ployed), the public authorities are organising a system of
other social security measures.
In Chile there are four types of guarantee: 
 Those who are not entitled to pension benefits
(including the minimum pension) provided by the mandato-
ry system receive a social allowance in the amount of 12%
of the average wage. 
 Those who have a record of no less than 20 years of
service are paid the amount lacking to the minimum pension
if the money accumulated on the individual account is lacking. 
 An average investment return is guaranteed. 
 Pension benefits are guaranteed if the insurance com-
pany goes bankrupt. The guarantees cover 100% of the
minimum pension and 75% of the sum above the minimum
wage up to a certain ceiling. All guarantees are paid from
one budget, except for the average investment return,
which is secured by pension funds themselves.
If investment return is at least 2% higher than wage
growth, no guarantees are necessary. Problems evolve
when low-paid workers quit to join the informal sector
after paying contributions for 20 years. But ink such cases
only the difference between the minimum pension and the
accumulated money is covered.
Another problem is that 12% of the average wage (i.e.
the social assistance mentioned above) is below the subsis-
tence level, while 25% of the average wage is below the
poverty line. This problem may be solved by offering a high-
er minimum pension for those who have contributed for a
longer period of time, e.g. by paying a fixed amount for all
plus 0.5% for each year contributions were paid.
All Latin American countries with private pension sys-
tems apply a related minimum investment return guarantee.
Each fund must generate a minimum return over a certain
period (usually 12 months) defined as a proportion of the
average return obtained by the pension fund industry. The
management companies (pension societies) are responsible
for compensating fund members if the return is insufficient
(in Argentina and Chile).  If the guaranteed return is applic-
able to one year, the investment policy becomes short
term-oriented. At present they are considering an exten-
sion to 3 or 5 years.
When the average investment return is guaranteed, all
pension funds are compelled to behave in the same way. In
addition, one year is too short a period for calculating
returns, as under such conditions volatile funds are
penalised, even though they produce better results over a
longer term, whereas investments which are close to the
permitted level are always profitable but bring lower
returns than the average.
5.1.2. Supervision of Pension Funds in Latin
American Countries
Generally, supervision institutions in Latin America are
devoted entirely to pension funds. This is attributed to the
fact that Latin American pension funds were created after or,
in some cases, at the same time as the supervision agencies. 
Comparing supervisory institutions of Latin American
pension funds, one can observe significant differences in
financing and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the
agency. In three countries the supervision agency has a sig-
nificant degree of autonomy  both in administrative and
political status. These three agencies are financed directly
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Table 5.3. Argentina, Chile and Peru: Comparison of investment limits and actual share of assets (June 1997)
  Assets   Argentina   Chile   Peru
  (% of fund)   actual   maximum   actual   maximum   actual   maximum
  Public-sector bonds   49.3   50   37.7   35/50   11.5   40
  Private-sector bonds   4.8   28   3.8   30/50   16.2   35
  Certificate of deposit   17.8   28   8.4   30/50   33.6   50
  Equities   21.8   35   29.3   35/50   34.8   30
  Mortgages   0.4   28   17.0   35/50   0.5   40
  Others   5.9      3.8      3.4   
  Total   100.0   169   100.0   165/250   100.0   195
Source: Rofman, R. and Demarco, G. (1998)24
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by supervised pension companies, through the payment of a
fee. At the other extreme, the agencies in Colombia and
Uruguay are a department of the Central Bank. Chile is a
halfway house, since the supervisory agency is separate
but with (administrative, political and financial) depen-
dence on the ministry of labour and social security (cf.
Table 5.4).
However, not only pension supervisory institutions
oversee this industry. As it belongs to the larger finan-
cial sector of the economy, it is supervised by other
institutions as well.  For example, in Chile there are
four institutions which have say in the industry: the
Superintendencia de Administradores de Fondos de Pen-
siones; the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros or
Superintendent of Securities and Insurance; Central
Bank of Chile; and the Risk Rating and Classification
Commission.
In Uruguay all financial institutions are supervised by
the Central Bank. In Argentina the Superintendencia de
Administradores de Fondos de Jubilacion y Pensiones is
joined by the Superintendent of Insurance, the Superin-
tendent of Banking and the Superintendent of Securi-
ties at equal levels, along with the Central Bank, the
Inland Revenue Bureau and the Department of Social
Security.
Performance of supervision institution
Table 5.5 presents several features of currently operat-
ing supervisory bodies from the point of view of their effec-
tiveness.
The Mexican supervisory institution is the largest of the
seven agencies, at least in terms of the number of employ-
ees. But this reflects differences in the number of affiliates to
pension funds (see Table 5.1)  over 14 million employees
are covered in Mexico, compared with more than 7 million
in Argentina, 6 million in Chile, 3 million in Colombia, just
over 2 million in Peru and fewer than half a million in Bolivia.
Consequently, Mexicos employee-to-fund-member ratio is
the second lowest after Colombia. The very high ratios in
Bolivia and Uruguay probably result from the relative youth
of their systems and the small number of pension-fund
members, which may cause problems due to a lack of scale,
whereas the high ratio in Peru may indicate inefficiency.
The ratio of the budget to the revenues flowing into
funds is less distorted. This measure shows how much of
workers contributions go to finance supervision (in systems
where fees pay for supervision). Because the supervision
agencies in Colombia and Uruguay are part of the Central
Bank, it is unfortunately not possible to isolate their budgets
from that of the parent institution. On this measure, the
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Table 5.4. Institutional characteristics of pension-fund supervisory agencies in Latin America
  Country   Area of government   Administrative and Political
Independence
  Funding source
  Argentina   Ministry of labour and social security   Autonomous   Supervision fee
  Bolivia   Treasury   Dependent   Supervision fee
  Chile   Ministry of labour and social security   Dependent   National budget
  Colombia   Central Bank   Dependent   Supervision fee
  Mexico   Treasury secretary   Autonomous   Supervision fee (partial)
  Peru   Ministry of the economy   Autonomous   Supervision fee
  Uruguay   Central Bank   Dependent   National budget
Source: Rofman, R. and Demarco, G. (1998)
Table 5.5. Latin America: Performance of Supervisory Institutions in Selected Countries
  Country   Employees   Budget   Employees/
fund members






    number   $ million   per million   number   %   %
  Argentina   183   12.5   30.5   10.2   0.14   0.36
  Bolivia   21   1.9   63.9   10.5   1.80   1.80
  Chile   134   7.0   23.2   10.1   0.02   0.28
  Colombia   30      11.9   3.3      
  Mexico   214   26.3   19.1   12.6   0.42   0.95
  Peru   85   5.1   73.9   14.2   0.34   1.23
  Uruguay   21      45.7   4.2      
Source: Rofman, R. and Demarco, G. (1998)
Note: Bolivia: budget/funds and budget/revenue are equal because the figures cover only one year of operation. The figures exclude the
Bonosol/Bolivida programme25
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cheapest agencies are those in Chile and Argentina, which
spend between 0.25% and 0.50% of total revenues. The
ratio of employees to the number of operating pension
funds appears to be the most consistent indicator. Its value
is close to 10 in most cases. The exceptions of Colombia
and Uruguay reflect the fact that supervision is a part of the
Central Bank, and so support services are part of the larger
organisation and outside the supervision agency.
5.2. Experiences of Selected OECD
Countries*
Pension funds in the OECD countries were established
much earlier than pension funds in the Latin American coun-
tries. They developed along very different tracks and no
tendency to unify them is visible today. However, one can
identify a group of countries where pension funds are
widespread or much more popular than elsewhere.
These are where occupational pension schemes have
been made mandatory. This is the case in Switzerland,
Denmark, the Netherlands and Australia. One must also
mention Sweden, which in 1998 significantly reformed
the public pension system and introduced an obligatory
capital segment into it, to which a mandatory premium of
2.5% is paid.  
In the other countries, participation in capital pension
funds is not obligatory, but they are so popular that they are
a significant element of securing income for old age. These
countries include the United States and the United King-
dom. Pension funds are also relatively popular in Belgium.
5.2.1. Activities of Pension Funds in Selected
OECD Countries: the Comparative Perspective
As we have said, pension funds can have one of several
legal formulas.
The legal structure of the private pension provision may be:
 Bank or insurance company,
 Management company, or
 Foundation/ trust/ mutual fund.
Pension fund assets may be wholly segregated, or min-
gled with other investors or asset managers.
Most countries require entire segregation of the assets
belonging to pension funds either from the sponsor
(employer) or management company. The pension fund can
be set as a trust (Anglo-American countries), a founda-
tion/mutual fund (European Countries) or a management
company (Latin American countries). A book reserve sys-
tem and accounts in financial institutions allows conjunction
of assets. 
Table 5.7 shows the diverse range of valuation methods
used in OECD countries.  
In Hungary, book value for assets valuation is used.
Unrealised capital gains are not included. Assets value is
recalculated quarterly at market prices. In Switzerland
there is no insistence on valuing assets at market prices,
therefore it is possible to manipulate prices. Artificial sales
and purchases of shares occur in order to realise capital
gains. Manipulation of returns in order to meet the estab-
lished minimum is also possible in this way.
Most of the countries have adopted formal accounting
standards  FAS 87 in the US, SSAP 24 in the UK, BiRiLiG in
Germany  which are also used in pension fund accounting.
The problem of funding arises only for defined benefit
(DB) pension plans. They may be fully or partly funded.
Some countries impose minimum funding requirements in
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* Chapter 5.2 is partly based on materials provided by Audrone Morkuniene, from the Lithuanian Free Market Institute.
Table 5.6. Pension fund assets and benefits paid in selected countries
  Country   Fund assets as %
  of GDP
  Share of pensions from PF as
  % of all retirement benefits
  Working population
  covered
  Belgium   4.0   8.0   31%
  Denmark   60.1   18.0 80% [1]
  The Netherlands   88.5   32.0   90%
  Switzerland   70.0   n.a.   100%
  Sweden   74.0   n.a.   90%
  United Kingdom   79.4   28.0   50%
  Australia   39.0   n.a.   n.a.
  United States   66.0   n.a.   46%
Source: European Commission (1997) and OECD (1998 a, b). For working population: Laboul (1999), p. 30
Note: [1] - Regarding to employees only26
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order to enhance the security of pension promises. Defined
contribution (DC) schemes are fully funded by their nature. 
In tax privileged DB schemes the problem of overfund-
ing  and not only insufficient funding  may arise. Govern-
ments are usually concerned not to allow too high tax sub-
sidies.  
Many OECD countries  Australia, Belgium, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland  also set portfolio lim-
its. In other countries, such as Canada, Denmark, Ireland,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United
States, there are no quantitative restrictions. However, pen-
sion funds are obliged to invest as a prudent person would
with his or her own money. 
Most of countries have some type of limits on possible
pension fund investments.
The actual structure of investments is shown in Table
5.8. It shows there is a significantly varied approach. Beside
countries with a large degree of boldness in investing in
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Table 5.8. Portfolio distribution of pension funds in selected OECD countries




  Loans   Other   Investments
abroad
  Australia 
(1)
  27.0   20.0   n.a.   39.0   n.a.
  Denmark   7.0   56.0   11.0   7.0   19.0   -
  Ireland 
(2)
  57.0   n.a.   n.a.   n.a.   7.0   n.a.
  Netherlands   30.0   4.0   19.0   43.0   6.0   15.0
  Sweden 
(1)
  1.0   84.0   n.a.   14.0   n.a.
  Switzerland   16.0   29.0   22.0   33.0   -
  United Kingdom   63.0   3.0   11.0   -   23.0   18.0
  USA   46.0   16.0   20.0   2.0   16.0   4.0
Source: World Bank (1994) p. 374, Davis (1993)
Notes: (1) For Australia and Sweden Bodie, Michell and Turner (1996). (2) For Ireland: OECD (1998 a, b)
Table 5.9. Simulated rate of return to private pension funds in selected countries: 1970  1990
  Country   1970  75   1975  80   1980 - 85   1985 - 90   1970-1990
  Denmark   -2.0   0.8   16.9   -   4.1
  Netherlands   -1.5   1.9   10.4   6.2   4.2
  Switzerland   -1.4   3.7   2.7   -0.2   1.2
  United Kingdom   -0.5   5.0   12.4   8.0   6.1
  USA   -1.6   -2.0   7.7   9.6   3.3
Source: World Bank (1994), Davis (1993)
Table 5.7.  Valuation bases in OECD countries
  Country   Equities   Bonds   Loans   Property
    Quoted   Unquoted   High quality   Low quality    
             
  Belgium   market   market   repayment   mkt/purchase   outstanding   market
  Denmark   mkt/purchase   mkt/purchase   amortised   amortised   amortised   mkt/purchase
  Ireland   market   market   market   market   market   market
  Netherlands   mkt/purchase   mkt/purchase   mkt/purchase   mkt/purchase   mkt/purchase   market
  Sweden   mkt/purchase   mkt/purchase   mkt/purchase   mkt/purchase   mkt/purchase   mkt/purchase
  Switzerland   adjusted market   adjusted market   amortised   amortised   market   
  United Kingdom   market   adjusted market   market   market   market   Market
  Australia   market   market   market   market   market   market
  United States   market   market   amortised   mkt/purchase   mkt/purchase   mkt/purchase
Source: Rofman, R. and Demarco, G. (1998)
Note: mkt/purchase means the lower of either the market or purchase price for quoted investments and the lower of the purchase price or writ-
ten-down book value for unquoted. Belgium: repayment value used for securities issued or guaranteed by the public sector; the lower of the market
or the purchase value applies to other high-quality bonds. Finland: mortgages are amortised, while other loans are adjusted to market value. Nether-
lands: bonds and loans can also be valued on an amortised basis. United States: data apply to New Jersey and Delaware27
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more risky instruments (United Kingdom, Ireland), there
are many examples of a moderate or even clearly conserv-
ative policy.
As regards the profitability, the rate of return of pension
funds varied substantially not only between countries, but
also in time spans (cf. data in the Table 5.9). The latter
demonstrates how much pension funds depended on finan-
cial markets. On the other hand, the size of pension funds
affected the structure of financial markets. Countries with
large funded schemes tend to have developed securities
markets, while in countries with small pension fund sector
capital markets are relatively less developed [Blommestein,
1998]. 
Data covering the period 196790 seem to support the
argument on differences in annual rates of return on pen-
sion fund investments between countries with prudent-per-
son rules compared with those with quantitative limits. The
first group gained relatively higher returns; more recently,
the difference in returns between the two groups widened
from  2.6 percentage points in 198493, to 4.3 in 198496
[Blommestein, 1998]. 
Despite the fact that most OECD countries have DC
schemes, under which all risks are taken on by the employ-
ee, they do not impose a guaranteed investment return
requirement. There are "guaranteed investment contracts"
at insurance companies and "guaranteed deposit contracts"
at commercial banks, promising interest lower by half than
one-year government securities.
Contribution holidays are permitted in the event of sur-
plus. Statutory surpluses may be refunded subject to a num-
ber of conditions, including indexation of present and future
pensions. 
Vested rights and portability differs significantly across
countries, posing serious obstacles to the portability of pen-
sion rights between distinct pension schemes and countries.
In certain countries the requirements are very strict. The
vesting period is one year of service in Belgium; in Denmark
 5 years or age 30, whichever is the earlier; in Spain 
immediate; in Ireland, 5 years; the Netherlands  1; the UK
 2 years; Switzerland  immediate vesting of minimum
benefits; Germany  age 35 or 10 years of service; and Lux-
embourg  from 5 up to 10 years. 
Payments from pension funds may be in the form of
annuities, periodical withdrawals or a lump sum. Some
countries allow only annuities. Lump sum payments are usu-
ally restricted.
The indexation of private pensions is very rare. It can be
applied both to pension benefits in payment and deferred
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Table 5.10. Vested rights in selected countries
  Country   Entitlement of vesting rights   Transfer modalities
  Belgium   Immediate on employee contribution
  1 year on employer contribution
  Transferability of vested reserves
  Denmark   Immediate   Possibility of transfer of surrender value
between occupational pension schemes
  Netherlands   1 year   Possibility of transfer, under same conditions,
within large network of pensions
  Sweden (ATP)   Immediate   Full transferability of national plans
  Switzerland   Immediate for minimum contribution   -
  United Kingdom   2 years   Transfer to the pension funds
  United States   5 years   Possibility of lump sum in case of transfer
Source: Laboul (1999), p. 33
Table 5.11. Indexation in private schemes in selected OECD countries
  Country   Existence/ Legal status
  Belgium   No indexation but possible adjustments
  Denmark   No mandatory indexation, but usual in practice by allotment of bonus
  Ireland   Indexation usual in practice
  Netherlands   No mandatory indexation, but usual in practice
  Sweden   Indexation
  Switzerland   Optional indexation
  United Kingdom   Benefits indexation
  United States   Discretionary indexation
Source: Davis (1995), Laboul (1999)28
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pension rights. The examples of mechanisms applied in this
regard in selected OECD countries are presented it the
Table 5.11. 
5.2.2. Brief Description of Pension Funds Activi-
ties in Selected Countries
Denmark
An obligatory capital segment of securing income for
old age (ATP) was introduced in Denmark in 1964. It pro-
vides benefits much higher than those from the public
segment. Benefits from the first pillar account for a dozen
or so percent of total retirement income, while the sec-
ond pillar accounts for close to 70%. Approximately
90% of working people belong to ATP . Pension funds in
the ATP system are managed by bodies representing
employees and employers. When pension plans are
defined contribution, employee representatives are in
the majority.
Companies are required to calculate the current value of
the vested benefits and to transfer that sum to the new plan.
However, the way this sum is calculated is often left to the
discretion of the managers, who tend to favour those who
stay in the plan. The sum depends on the premises used in
the calculation.
Netherlands
In the Netherlands, pension plans are mandatory through
industry-wide agreements. Separate plans may be provided only
by companies (usually large ones) that offer conditions not
worse than industry plans. Insurance conditions are the same for
all members. There are no choices, and therefore administrative
costs are very low, about four times lower than those of insur-
ance companies. Boards of management of pension plans con-
sist of equal numbers of employees and employers represen-
tatives. There are no special rules or responsibilities imposed on
the managers of pension arrangements other than in respect of
financial safeguards and disclosure practices. Pension scheme
assets must be fully segregated from the sponsors assets. 
Approximately 90% of all employed people belong to
pension funds. The per capita asset value of these funds is
the highest in the world. The investment policy used to be
conservative. A significant move towards shares was only
effected 10 years ago.
Funding is obligatory not only during the investment peri-
od, but also in the phase of annuity. Contribution holidays are
permitted in the event of surpluses but not reversions.
Entitlements of vesting rights are applied after one year.
Accrued benefits are indexed. There is transferability with-
in pension circuits with the same conditions.
So as to prevent the imposition of age requirements, the
law regulates participation conditions: all employees over
the age of 21 or with one year of service are to be included
in a pension plan if it is applicable for that particular profes-
sional group.
The Netherlands put a ceiling on pension benefits pro-
vided from tax-privileged plans so that they do not divest all
earnings. They therefore establish not only vesting periods,
but also benefit-accrual schedules so as to prevent the
acquisition of either very extensive or very limited rights to
pensions during a minimum obligatory period.
The Netherlands pension fund members must be
offered annuities as they reach the retirement age.
Switzerland
In Switzerland since 1985 all employers must provide
oldage, survivors and disability pensions for their employees.
DC schemes are mandatory for all employees in a company.
Employees have no choice other than to accept labour and
pension contracts together. Workers contribute up to 50% of
total contributions. Death and disability risks must be insured. 
Yet certain groups, such as young employees, employees
of retirement age or low-income workers, may be exclud-
ed from mandatory schemes. Pension schemes are not
obligatory for employees under 25. In Switzerland, people
earning less than 40% of the average wage are not required
to pay into second-pillar pension funds.
In Switzerland pension funds are established as founda-
tions with full legal separation of the pension fund from the
employersponsor. Pension fund councils (management)
must comprise equal numbers of employers and employ-
ees representatives. 
Maximum investment limits for Swiss pension funds are:
 100% cash and fixed interest,
 80% property,
 50% equities and other securities,
 30% foreign bonds with a maximum of 5% per debtor,
 30% foreign currency bonds, equities, securities.
In reality Swiss pension fund investments concentrate
62% in fixed income securities and 38% in equities and real
estate. Switzerland is subject to the severest investment
restrictions:
 in Switzerland the pension fund must guarantee a nom-
inal 4% investment return annually,
 all plans need approval from an expert that they are
properly financed,
 a mandatory minimum pension benefit is set.
Sweden
Since 1998, 2.5% of pensionable earnings have been set
aside and transferred into a fully funded pension system.
CASE Reports No. 3629
Rational Pension Supervision
This part is administered separately from the pay-as-you-go
system. The rest of the administration and insurance func-
tion of this sub-system is under public responsibility. The
scheme has the following characteristics:
 contributions are accumulated in one or several funds
which the individual chooses,
 the amount in the funds increases by the investment
yield on the savings that are deposited,
 the pension is determined by the conventional private
insurance principle.
United Kingdom
In the UK a pension scheme must be established under irrev-
ocable trust managed by trustees who are personally responsi-
ble for the investment of the assets in a prudent way. Small com-
panies are generally managed by insurance companies.
The UK recently brought in a requirement under the Pen-
sions Act 1995 giving members a right to nominate trustees.
There are mandatory minimum funding requirements.
Funds may not be below actuarial obligations. In cases of
more than 10% underfunding the employer is either
required to provide securities or to transfer the shortfall to
the fund. The 1995 Pensions Act introduced a minimum
funding legislation, which requires DB plans to hold suffi-
cient assets to meet their liabilities in the event of immedi-
ate wind-up.
In the UK written principles of investment decisions are
mandatory.
The management of assets is governed by several broad
concepts:
 Investment decisions must be made in a prudent and
reasonable manner on the basis of a level of skill, expertise
and diligence that would be expected of a person with sim-
ilar investment responsibilities. This is called the prudence
requirement and is the most basic concept that underlines
the whole regulation.
 Investment decisions must be made for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits.
 Assets must be diversified so as to minimise the risk of
large losses.
There is a compensation scheme for funded plans to pro-
vide up to 90 per cent of liabilities in the event of an offence
involving dishonesty. Solvency margins are regulated.
Vesting applies after 2 years, as does indexation of
accrued benefits. Members have the right to transfer to
other pension funds, but there is no obligation on a fund to
accept a transfer from another fund.
The maximum increase of the annual pension payment
is whichever is the highest: 3% above an increase in the
retail price index, or as required by social security. Limited
price indexation (retail price increases up to 5%) must
apply to all benefits earned from April 1997, with the
exception of Additional Voluntary Contributions.
A maximum lump sum payment permitted at normal
pension age is 1.5 times the final remuneration after 20
years of service (less for shorter periods of service). 
United States 
In the USA, private pensions are employer sponsored
schemes operating on a purely voluntary basis. Supplemen-
tary pensions can be both private and public (from the gov-
ernment as an employer).
The sponsor plays a key role in the system by collecting
contributions, holding assets for investment and paying out
benefits. The number of private plans has increased from about
300,000 in 1975 to about 700,000 today. The majority are sin-
gle employer plans. Only 3,000 are sponsored by unions.
Pension plans cover about 50% of the full-time work-
force. Of these, one third are in defined benefit, one third
are in defined contribution, and one third are in both. Many
DC plans (401) operate as supplements to DB plans, allow-
ing employees to make their own contributions.
In the USA, the tax laws can be viewed as a means of
establishing a basic structure for the financing and benefits
of pension plans. They are very specific in terms of how
benefits must be distributed among the workers in an
enterprise and the amount of funds that must be set aside
each year to pay for these benefits. 
Among the most important of these rules are the fol-
lowing general requirements:
 workers have an irrevocable right to benefits after
working a maximum of five years,
 at least 70% of workers participate in the plan in most
cases,
 highly paid employers and owners of companies can-
not receive benefits that are more than their salaries,
 the maximum level of benefits that may receive special
tax treatment must be established, and
 the sponsor sets aside in a separate legal account suf-
ficient funds to pay for the benefits promised.
Pension funds in the USA are established as trusts. Even
401 plans, which may be individual DC schemes, should
have a trust established with its trustees, even if the whole
management is delegated to investment funds. If a pension
fund outsources all its activity, the responsibility remains
with the trustees appointed by the pension fund founder. 
In the USA, the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) created a system of legal requirements
and enforcement to ensure that the assets set aside are ade-
quately safeguarded. The protection of assets is ensured by
the application of fiduciary requirements: the assets must be
segregated from those of the sponsor of the plan. They
have to be held in the custody of a third party (or trust) and
managed solely at the discretion of the trustee.
The US tax laws specify minimum standards for the fair-
ness and funding of pension plans that must be met to
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obtain special treatment. This is one of the major regulato-
ry mechanisms for employee benefits. 
ERISA provides a regulatory framework for the
application of investment standards by:
 providing relatively specific definitions of what consti-
tutes the assets of a pension trust,
 establishing a relatively broad functional of who is con-
strued to be responsible for the management of these assets
(the fiduciaries),
 imposing significant liabilities on these fiduciaries.
In practice this regime creates a very flexible set of stan-
dards. This may by interpreted as its strength because it is
continually adaptable to the rapidly changing financial mar-
kets. It is also, however, a source of considerable difficulties
in implementation due to the degree of uncertainty it may
impose on practitioners and the interpretative burdens it
places on the regulators.
Another principle of ERISA in governing US private pen-
sion funds is that it is essentially a conflict of interest statute.
The law specifies parties or individuals that may have inter-
ests that are in opposition to those of the trust, and pro-
hibits them from engaging in transactions with the trust.
Pension plans now hold more than one-fifth of the total
financial assets in the US economy. About 40% of the assets
are invested in pools managed by banks and insurance com-
panies. 
The US, like the Netherlands, put a ceiling on pension
benefits derived from tax-privileged plans so that they do
not divest all earnings. Indexation of benefits is not obligato-
ry, but almost universal in practice. The Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation was established in 1974 to guaran-
tee pension benefits up to a specific ceiling. All private DB
plans must participate.
Australia
Retirement benefit coverage has become mandatory for
Australian employees  a policy embodied in the Superan-
nuation Guarantee in 1992. The government legislated that
employers should pay into an "approved" superannuation
fund a percentage of the earnings of their employees, thus
effectively making mandatory what had been, since the mid-
eighties, part of a national agreement between employers
and employee organisations.
A phase-in schedule was also legislated, with employ-
er contributions rising to 9% of earnings by the year
2002. It is envisaged that, by then, a 3% employee con-
tribution will also be required. As a result of this manda-
tory retirement saving policy, superannuation coverage has
increased from 40% of all employees in 1987 to over
90% in 1995.
Australian superannuation funds face few investment
restrictions. There are no asset requirements or floors
and no minimum rate of return requirements. As a
result, superannuation funds tend to invest in a wide
variety of assets with a mix of duration and risk/return
characteristics.
Until the 1980s, the Australian superannuation mar-
ket was largely self-regulated and was therefore subject
to much less control than was the practice elsewhere.
However, in conjunction with its policy of broadening the
coverage of superannuation the government began to
play a larger role in the regulation and supervision of the
industry.
The first major regulatory initiative was the implemen-
tation of in-house asset limits in March 1985. This was fol-
lowed by the introduction of a comprehensive set of oper-
ational standards for superannuation funds under the
Occupational Standards and Supervision Act
(OSSA) and Regulations of 1987. This legislation estab-
lished an industry supervisory body, the Insurance and
Superannuation Commission (ISC), and set out
requirements for tax concessions, investments, benefit
standards, member participation and reporting and disclo-
sure. As the Australian Government does not have the
constitutional power to make laws concerning superannu-
ation per se, the enforcement of OSSA was tied to the tax
concessions provided to superannuation funds. Superannu-
ation funds that did not comply with the requirements of
OSSA were not eligible for superannuation tax conces-
sions. The main tax concession for compliant funds is the
15% rate on fund income. Non-compliant funds are sub-
ject to tax at the top personal marginal rate. 
In 1993 OSSA was superseded by the Superannuation
Industry Supervision (SIS) legislation, which increased
the level of prudential supervision and required standards of
the industry. The SIS expanded the jurisdiction of the regu-
latory body, the ISC, providing it with greater enforcement
powers. It also clarified the duties and responsibilities of
trustees and investment managers, and encouraged greater
member participation. Previously the ISC shared the
responsibility with other regulators, including the Reserve
Bank, The Australian Securities Commission and the State
Government.
One of the main innovations of the SIS has been to place
the regulation of superannuation funds on a different legal
basis under the constitution. Previously, the Australian Gov-
ernments taxation power was used, and eligibility tax con-
cessions were dependent upon a fund complying with
OSSA. A particular problem with this approach, however,
was that the only sanction for non-compliance was the with-
drawal of a funds tax concessions, which would hurt fund
members rather than the trustees who were responsible for
the breach of regulations.
To overcome this problem, the SIS is enacted under the
Australian Governments corporations and pension powers,
in addition to the taxation power. This strengthens the abil-
ity of the Australian Government to legislate in the area of
superannuation and, in particular, allows legislation to target
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individuals responsible for intentional or reckless non-com-
pliance with the duties and standards contained in the SIS
legislation. 
The current regulatory framework covers three main
areas: industry supervision, contributions and benefit stan-
dards, and member rights. 
 Industry standards
SIS makes trustees solely responsible for the prudent
operation of their funds. To enhance this, the SIS codifies
the duties of trustees and investment managers. This
approach allows them maximum commercial autonomy in
their investment decisions.
Trustees are personally liable under both civil and crimi-
nal law for breaches of their obligations. Penalties range
from disqualification and fines to prison terms. The regula-
tory framework also extends to other service such as
investment managers, custodians, auditors and actuaries.
 Investment Standards
In light of the obligations of trustees to formulate and
implement an investment strategy, the SIS imposes a num-
ber of restrictions on the investment of superanuation fund
assets. These include:
 Investment in in-house assets must not exceed a statu-
tory maximum. A reduction in the statutory maximum from
10% of the cost to 5% of the market value of assets is being
phased in by 2000/2001.
 Borrowing except on a short-term basis to make ben-
efit payments or to cover settlement of securities transac-
tions is prohibited. 
 Funds must be maintained for the "sole purpose" of
providing retirement benefits, so they cannot be used as a
means of conducting business.
 All investment must be on an arms length basis.
 Loans or financial assistance to, or acquisitions from,
members (or their relatives) are prohibited.
Importantly, however, the investment restrictions
extend neither to asset requirements or limitations nor a
required rate of return. Neither is there a government
guarantee of member benefits. Instead, the security and
adequacy of superannuation benefits relies upon compli-
ance with the supervisory regime established under the SIS.
Particularly important is the requirement that an investment
policy be formulated and that it be implemented according
to the prudent person principle.
 Reporting requirements
The SIS legislation was introduced essentially to protect
the interests of members. One way of enhancing this is to
keep members fully informed. As such, the reporting
requirements have been designed to facilitate members
understanding of their superannuation entitlements and the
investment policy and performance of the superannuation
fund. The SIS requires that trustees report regularly to fund
members and, when requested, disclose certain informa-
tion. This includes both member specific and fund details.
Member specific reports are to be sent to members on
at least an annual basis, when they join or leave a fund, and
in case of "one-off" special events. They are to include
details of contributions, accrued benefits, earnings, fees and
charges deducted, and other benefits such as for death or
disability.  Fund information is generally sent to members in
the form of an annual report. This must include details of
the trustees and fund managers, the main accounting and
financial data and the main investment information. Invest-
ment information must include the investment strategy of
the fund; details of investments that exceed 5% of assets;
the earnings of the fund; and the reserving policy. Members
can obtain other relevant information on request.
 Contribution and benefit standards
Contribution and benefit standards aim to ensure the
superannuation funds are used for genuine retirement
income needs and not for other purposes such as the short-
term exploitation of tax concessions.
The SIS attempts to address this by establishing rules
relating to the contributions made to, and benefits
received from, the superannuation funds. These include
rules relating to the age limits for acceptance of contribu-
tions and payments of benefits, the employment status of
fund contributors, access to benefits by members (the
preservation of minimum payment standards) and the min-
imum benefits owned by members (vesting or minimum
benefit standards).
 Contributions
A fund may accept contributions or, in the case of a
defined benefit scheme, grant benefit accruals in limited cir-
cumstances only. The general rule is that contributions can
be accepted only until a member is aged 65, and only if the
member is or was within the past two years in the paid
workforce or is no longer in the workforce because of ill
health.
 Benefits
Prior to the introduction of mandatory employer contri-
butions, vesting, preservation and portability generally only
applied to employee contributions and the earnings there-
on. Under OSSA some compulsory vesting, preservation
and portability was introduced and this has been extended
under the SIS legislation.
The SIS contains minimum benefits standards ensuring
full vesting applies to all member and mandatory employer
contributions provided under awards or the Superannua-
tion Guarantee, and the investment earnings on these con-
tributions. Vesting is not required for non-mandatory
employer contributions. 
In Australia vested rights are deferred until retirement
age; they are not transferred to another fund. As a conse-
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quence, each worker can hold several accounts with only
one active (contributions paid in).
The minimum payment standards in the SIS require
that superannuation benefits be fully preserved to the
statutory preservation age. Since July 1, 1996, this has
applied to all superannuation benefits that have been
subject to concessional taxation. Generally, it is
required that benefits be preserved until the statutory
preservation age. This is currently 55, but is being pro-
gressively increased to 60 by the year 2025. Earlier
withdrawals are available in the event of death, tempo-
rary or permanent disability, permanent departure from
Australia and, with the discretion of the ISC, the cases
of financial hardship. 
Preserved benefits are also portable between funds.
When a member leaves an employer, preserved benefits can
be transferred to a new employers superannuation fund, to
a master trust, an approved deposit fund or an eligible
rollover fund. Alternatively, they can be used to buy a
deferred annuity from a life insurance company.
 Members rights
The SIS provides for considerable member participa-
tion in the operation and management of superannuation
funds. At least 50% or half of the trustees of superannua-
tion fund should be members. Members of all funds are
required to receive certain fund and member information
on a regular basis; and members have the right to bring
civil and criminal action against trustees and investment
managers who have failed in their duties. In addition, mem-
bers have access to a comprehensive mechanism for
resolving disputes through compulsory, fund-based, inter-
nal arrangements and if these fail under the Superannuation
Complaints Tribunal.
5.2.3. Supervision Over Pension Funds
Status of the supervisory authority
Table 5.12 shows the situation in OECD countries. Pen-
sion-fund supervision is usually the responsibility of a sepa-
rate agency, although ministries are directly involved in Aus-
tria, Finland, Greece, Japan, Spain and the USA (first col-
umn).  In 17 countries the supervision of pension funds is
part of the supervision of other insurance markets (second
column).  Pensions and insurance have a number of com-
mon characteristics, such as similar organisation and opera-
tion.  Insurance companies have a major role in the pension
sector in many countries, managing 2030 per cent of total
pension assets across the OECD.  They often offer group-
insurance plans and act as investment and benefit managers.  
The agency responsible for pension-fund supervision
also sets regulations in selected countries (third column). 
The Australian Prudent Regulation Authority oversees in
Australia both the Bank Supervision Department of the
Reserve Bank of Australia and the Insurance and Superannu-
ation Commission, which in turn oversees superannuation
funds, life and general insurance and insurance brokers.
In the Netherlands pension funds are supervised by the
Dutch Insurance Chamber, along with life insurance compa-
nies. Solvency is top priority. The framework of rules is
quite liberal. In Ireland there are the Pension Board and Irish
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Table 5.12. Supervisory authorities in OECD countries
  Country   Supervision   Insurance   Regulation
  Australia   Insurance and Superannuation Commission   same   same
  Belgium   Insurance Supervisory Office   same   Ministry of Economic Affairs/
same
  Denmark   Financial Supervisory Authority   same   same
  Ireland   Pension Board   Irish insurance federation   Ministry of Enterprise and
Employment
  Netherlands   Insurance Supervisory Body   same   Ministry of Social affairs and
Employment
  Sweden   Financial Supervisory Authority   same   same
  Switzerland   Federal Office of Social Insurance/Federal
Office of supervision of private insurance
  same   Federal ministries
  United
Kingdom
  Financial services authority and occupational
pensions regulatory authority
  same (financial services
authority)
  Departments of Trade and
Industry and Social Security
  United States   Department of Labor (Pension and welfare
benefits administration)
  Department of Commerce
and the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners
  same
Source: Rofman and Demarco (1998), Laboul (1999)33
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Revenue Commissioners. In Germany book reserve
arrangement and support funds are supervised by the
Ministry of Finance. Pension funds and insurance con-
tracts are supervised by the insurance supervision
authority, BAV.
In 1997 OPRA  the Occupational Pensions Regulatory
Authority  was established in the UK. It can suspend a pen-
sion scheme or replace it by other schemes. The Inland
Revenue Office also exercises control relating to fiscal mat-
ters. There is a Pensions Ombudsman institution and Occu-
pational Pensions Advisory service.
In the US the regulation of pension plans is conducted
exclusively by two agencies of the Federal Government: the
Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Labour.
Pension plans are provided with special tax status in which
contributions to plans and earnings from investments are
not generally taxed until they are distributed to employees.
These tax provisions are extremely complex. They are
administered by the Internal Revenue Service of the Trea-
sury Department. 
The legal basis for the regulation of pension funds in the
US was established by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, commonly known as ERISA. ERISA
provides a uniform basic structure and requirement for pri-
vate pension plans, and a system for providing government
guarantees of the benefits for DB plans. Enforcement of
ERISA is carried out by the Pension and Welfare Benefits
Administration of the Department of Labour.
Powers of supervision
The US Department of Labour is provided with broad
authority:
 to interpret and apply the general principles embodied
in the statute,
 to obtain information and to investigate pension plans
that appear to be in violation of standards,
 to refer cases to the Federal courts to recover any
loses that may result from the failure of fiduciaries to adhere
to ERISA requirements.
Each year the Department of Labour conducts about
2,500 investigations into pension plans. When indications of
a violation of the law are found, an attempt is made to reach
a voluntary agreement that will correct the violation.
Most of the cases are resolved in this manner, which
usually involves the repayment of monies to the pension
fund or the sale of assets that represent a conflict of inter-
est. If an agreement can not be reached or there is evidence
of criminal activity the case is referred to the appropriate
legal authorities in the federal government and ultimately
the courts.
The supervisory authority does not have authority to go
to the courts on its own. In the United Kingdom the Occu-
pational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA) has wide
powers to ensure that trustees, employers and their advis-
ers comply with their statutory duties, and to impose penal-
ties and disqualification when they do not. Plan auditors and
actuaries have "whistle blowing"  functions.
In Ireland the Pension Board has powers under the Pen-
sions Act of 1990 to ensure that trustees and others
involved with pension plans comply with their statutory
duties. There are mandatory "whistle blowing" require-
ments for all involved with pension plans in relation to fraud
or misappropriation and also voluntary "whistle blowing".
Information disclosure
Disclosure requirements, that is one of the main instru-
ments in pension fund supervision, vary enormously in
Europe. The United Kingdom and Ireland have the most
comprehensive rules. Irish and UK trustees must provide a
statement of individual benefits and an audited annual
report nine months after the year-end in Ireland and one
year after in the United Kingdom. Trust deeds must be
made available as well. Members of employer-based
schemes must be informed of eligibility rules, the calculation
of contributions and the type and level of benefits. In the
report trustees must account for the collection of contribu-
tions, the number of beneficiaries, asset investments and
the payment of benefits. In addition they need to provide an
actuarial valuation of assets and liabilities, performance rat-
ing and remuneration of managers. 
In the US, pension fund members must receive an annu-
al report outlining the plan and the  rights to receive a pen-
sion. Austria, Denmark, France, Spain and Switzerland also
have legal requirements to inform members. In other coun-
tries, such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, there is no legal
requirement to inform members, and there exists the risk
that plan members do not have adequate information to
assess the performance of their funds.  
EU requirements
In 1997 The European Commission issued a Green
paper, "Supplementary Pensions in the Single Market", the
core elements of which were freedom of investments based
on the prudent person principle, freedom to choose asset
managers and custodians, and a level playing field between
operators (life insurers vs. pension funds).
Assets held by funds of EU member states comprise
20% of the EU GDP . However, it is the only major financial
sector without any explicit legal EU framework. Within the
EU, there is:
 no transferability of private pension rights,
 no cross-border membership of pension funds,
 a number of investment restrictions.
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Equal treatment of men and women is the fundamental
EU requirement applicable to pension schemes. The retire-
ment age and contributions may not vary for men and
women within the EU countries after the Barber case of
1990 and the Coloroll case of 1994. However, this require-
ment will be enforced fully only for schemes started after
May 17, 1990 so that the existing schemes would not be
injured financially. Spouses pensions have to be equal as
well. No distinction of part-time workers is permitted. The
retirement age may be increased for any gender so that it is
the same for both [Avdel Systems Ltd case, 1994].
After the Barber case the European Court acknowl-
edged that pensions represent deferred wages i.e. salaries,
but not remuneration for loyalty. Close attention should
therefore be paid as to how employers meet their liabilities
and whether pension rights are lost upon job changes.
While the EU treaty sets the goal of free movement of
capital within the member countries, many restrictions to
invest outside the countries still exist [7].
Conclusion
It is difficult to compare Latin American supervision institu-
tions with those in OECD countries because their design is
quite different. Latin American supervision is more proac-
tive. For example, in the US, the Department of Labour
reviews just 1% of pension-related documents each year.
Supervision institutions in Latin America are devoted
entirely to pension funds, which is not always the case in
OECD countries. One of the main reasons for these differ-
ent approaches is historical: in developed countries pri-
vately managed pension schemes had existed for some
time before the supervisory agency was created.  There-
fore, the supervision structure had to be adapted to the
shape of the pensions industry. In contrast, Latin American
pension funds were created after or, in some cases, at the
same time as supervision agencies.  Although Austria, Ire-
land, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
USA have comprehensive pension laws as in Latin America,
in other OECD countries regulations are found across a
range of legal provisions.
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